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Abstract
This paper considers how price auctions compare with two-dimensional
bidding on price and quality, when bidders have comparative advantages.
Two-dimensional bids are evaluated by a scoring rule decided by the auction-
eer and three auction types are evaluated: a) a scoring auction re￿ ecting the
auctioneer￿ s true preferences; b) a scoring auction with ￿optimal￿distortion
of quality in the scoring rule; and c) a price-only auction with optimal quality
threshold. The main ￿ndings are: 1) while the auctioneer always prefers the
scoring auction, bidders may favour the price auction to the scoring auction
and vice versa, depending on underlying conditions of the type space and cost
parameters; and 2) the auctioneer can exploit ￿rms￿comparative advantages
to level the ￿eld. An optimal scoring auction can, in some circumstances, ex-
tract all rent from bidders, leaving the auctioneer with all the e¢ ciency gain
from the bidding process. There even exists a knife-edge situation where the
auctioneer can extract all rent when using his true preferences as the scoring
rule.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, both practitioners and theorists have given more focus to scoring
auctions, i.e., auctions where contestants are bidding on price and quality, and
these multidimensional bids are ranked by a scoring function that generates a single
dimensional value: ￿the score￿ .1 In the academic literature, large strides have been
taken, particularly by Che (1993), Branco (1997), and Asker and Cantillon (2008).
Nevertheless, there is still a lot to be done before we fully understand the properties
of this auction format. Milgrom (2004) points out:
￿The idea that scoring can increase bidders￿pro￿ts without reducing the
auctioneer￿ s value has been one of the main appeals of multidimensional bid-
ding in procurement. Bidders (sellers) dislike bidding in price-only auctions
in which their special advantages and characteristics receive no weight. By
encouraging a more complete comparison of the attributes of suppliers and
products, scoring may increase bidders￿expected pro￿ts and encourage par-
ticipation by more bidders, serving the interests of all parties. The theory
does not give unquali￿ed support to this intuitive argument. The conditions
under which scoring bene￿ts bidders and auctioneers alike remain an open
question￿ .
This paper builds upon the above-mentioned papers and extends their work to
study how scoring auctions work when ￿rms have comparative advantages, mean-
ing that they have di⁄erent costs associated with a given improvement of quality.
Three auctions are compared: a) a scoring auction re￿ ecting the auctioneer￿ s true
preferences for price versus quality; b) a scoring auction where the auctioneer is able
to distort the scoring rule away from his true preferences towards price and quality;
1Public procurement accounted for nearly 16% of GDP in Europe in 2002. In the directive
of public procurement in the EU, Article 53 states that contracting authorities can award public
contracts either by ￿the tender most economically advantageous￿or ￿the lowest price only￿ . The
contracting authorities shall specify in the contract documents the relative weighting that it gives
to each of the criteria chosen to determine the most economically advantageous tender. In case
it is not possible to weight these criteria (for demonstrable reasons), the authorities shall, as a
minimum, rank the criteria in descending order of importance.
2and c) a price auction with minimum quality threshold. I dub the ￿rst format the
￿na￿ve￿scoring auction and the second the ￿optimal￿scoring auction.2
When ￿rms only di⁄er in marginal costs of quality, i.e., there are no ￿xed cost
di⁄erences, both bidders and the auctioneer prefer the na￿ve scoring auction to
the price auction, but the auctioneer can improve his outcome by committing to
an optimal scoring auction, not preferred by the bidders. This result is shown
by Che (1993) and is replicated towards the end of section 3 of this paper.3 Che
(1993) considers a model with independent types (costs) and three variations of
scoring auctions: the ￿rst-score (the winning ￿rm delivers its bid combination); the
second-score (the winning ￿rm delivers any combination yielding the same score as
the runner up); and the second-preferred-o⁄er (the winning ￿rm must deliver the
runner up￿ s exact combination). Che shows that with a scoring rule re￿ ecting the
buyer￿ s true preferences, these three auction types give the same expected utility
for the buyer, and, hence, it is a two-dimensional version of the revenue equivalence
theorem (RET) (Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), and Riley and Samuelson (1981)).
However, a scoring rule re￿ ecting the true preferences of the buyer entails excessive
quality under the ￿rst two formats, since they do not account for the informational
costs associated with higher quality. This corresponds well to the mechanism-design
literature (La⁄ont and Tirole (1987), (1993)). Che therefore considers other scoring
rules and ￿nds that the ￿rst- and second-score auctions can implement the optimal
outcome (the second-preferred-o⁄er is unable to do so), and this optimal scoring
rule systematically discriminates against quality.4
The papers that are closest to the present one are Asker and Cantillon (2005) and
(2008). In both papers, they study scoring auctions in which price enters linearly
into the scoring rule and suppliers￿private information about costs are multidimen-
2Note the quotation mark, as I only consider one way of distorting preferences, and there may
exist more or less intricate ways to do the same.
3A path that is not followed in this paper is the e⁄ect of correlated costs. Branco (1997)
studies this, and contrary to what Che (1993) ￿nds, one-stage multidimensional mechanisms will
not implement the ￿rst-best outcome. One will need a two-stage mechanism, where the ￿rst stage
evaluates bids according to a scoring function, and a second round where the ￿rst-round winner
bargains with the buyer.
4See Klemperer (2004) for a brief discussion of the similarities between La⁄ont and Tirole (1987)
and Che (1993) and the connection to the Linkage Principle (Milgrom and Weber (1982))
3sional, so they are able to consider situations where ￿rms di⁄er in their ￿xed and
variable (marginal) costs. In this paper, suppliers￿private information about costs
are one-dimensional since I wish to highlight the e⁄ect of comparative advantages.
Asker and Cantillon (2008) derive two sets of results. First, they describe equilib-
rium behaviour, and show the correspondence between scoring auctions and single
dimension auctions for independent private values. Second, they compare the scoring
auctions with other commonly used procedures to buy di⁄erentiated goods. They
show that from the buyer￿ s viewpoint, scoring auctions always strictly dominate
price-only auctions with minimum quality standards, and dominate menu auctions
and beauty contests depending on the auction format.5 However, Asker and Can-
tillon (2008) do not discuss how the auctioneer can use comparative advantages to
level the ￿eld through scoring auctions. In Asker and Cantillon (2005), compara-
tive advantages is studied, but restricted to discrete distributions, while this paper
looks at a continuous cost function. However, they do ￿nd, as this paper does, that
scoring auctions do well compared with other commonly used procedures.
This paper shows that, for a certain set of preferences and cost functions, even
the na￿ve scoring auction can level the ￿eld in such a way that all bidder pro￿t is
competed away. That means that it is a ￿rst-best solution, and the scoring auction
re￿ ecting the auctioneer￿ s true preferences is indeed the optimal one. Moving away
from this knife-edge situation, the scoring auctions can bene￿t both bidders and
the auctioneer under certain conditions. The reason being that the scoring auction
allows ￿rms to exploit their comparative advantages in the bidding process. This
results in an e¢ ciency gain compared with the price auction, and this can be shared
between the auctioneer and the bidders. However, in an optimal scoring auction,
the auctioneer can distort his preferences in such a way that he is able to capture
all the gains, and bidders will then prefer the price auction. This is most likely to
happen when the type space is large and there exist comparative advantages.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the model where two ￿rms
compete. In Section 3, I show the outcome in the three auction formats, when ￿rms
5For a discussion of price auction with quality thresholds, see Cripps and Ireland (1994) and
Cabizza and De Fraja (1998), who also discuss quality considerations in auctions.
4have comparative advantages or only di⁄er in marginal costs. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Two risk-neutral ￿rms compete to win the right to deliver a speci￿c project. Firms￿
costs are given by:




where A ￿ 0 is a common cost parameter, s is quality, and ￿i is the ￿rm￿ s type,
i = 1;2. Let ￿i s U [￿L;￿H] and types are stochastically independently drawn.
Firms have private knowledge about their own cost parameters. The ￿rst term
in the cost function is a type-speci￿c ￿xed cost, while the other term is variable
costs. Costs are then not necessarily monotonically increasing in type, but can be
decreasing for a su¢ ciently large A, re￿ ecting comparative advantages. Some ￿rms
might be good at delivering high quality to a low variable cost (low ￿i), while others
can deliver low ￿xed cost, associated with the project (high ￿i).
A risk-neutral auctioneer seeks to maximize his utility, given as the consumer
surplus, V . The quantity delivered in the project is normalized to 1, so V is decided
by the relationship between price, p, and quality, s. Because the quality parameter,
being multidimensional by nature, can be computed as a one-dimensional number
in monetary terms, price and quality can be evaluated along the same dimension.
The consumer surplus is described as:
V (p;s) = v0 +
p
s ￿ p; (2)
where v0 > 0 is a common parameter for the consumers￿surplus function. Because
quality is concave in the consumer surplus function and linear in the cost function, I
use ￿rst-order conditions to search for optimal quality. Based on his preferences, the
auctioneer creates a scoring auction to maximize consumer surplus. Let the scoring
function be given by:
￿(p;s;￿) = ￿
p
s ￿ p: (3)
5When ￿ = 1, the scoring function re￿ ects the auctioneer￿ s true preferences, while
￿ 6= 1 distorts from his true preferences. Price and quality can then be mapped into
a one-dimensional score. Because the auctioneer and the bidders are risk neutral and
the bidders￿types are distributed according to an atomless continuous distribution,
it follows:
Remark 1 For any given scoring rule, ￿rst-score and second-score sealed bid auc-
tions, English score auctions, and Dutch score auctions will all yield the same ex-
pected revenue, hence, the RET is satis￿ed.
Satisfying the RET, English auctions are used in the setup for computational
convenience. The timing of the model is as follows: ￿rst, the auctioneer decides
which mechanism to use and publicly announces his decision; and second, the bidders
post their bids, and the mechanism selects a winner. The competition is run as a
scoring auction (bidding on price and quality) or as a price auction with minimum
quality requirements (a quality level above the minimum requirement receives no
weight in the auction).6
In the next section, I analyse the three auction types given the setup described
above.
3 Auction Outcomes
In this section, I ￿rst look at the special case where A = 1
4, and it turns out that the
na￿ve scoring auction and the optimal scoring auction coincide. Next, I show that
when 0 < A < 1
4, this is no longer true, and that the optimal scoring auction yields
a higher expected consumer surplus than the na￿ve scoring auction and the optimal
price auction. Lastly, I brie￿ y show the case where ￿rms only di⁄er in marginal
costs of quality, A = 0
6Technically, the price auction is a special case of the scoring auctions, where:
￿(p;s) =
￿ p
s0 ￿ p s ￿ s0
0 otherwise;
and s0 is the minimum quality threshold.
61) A = 1
4
a) and b): The na￿ve (and optimal scoring) auction First, consider the
English scoring auction where the auctioneer states his true preferences as the scoring
function (￿ = 1) and let tW denote the winning score. To maximize consumers￿




fp ￿ c(s;￿i)g s:t:
p
s ￿ p = t
W; (4)
and by substituting for p in the objective function this simpli￿es to a maximization














Asker and Cantillon (2008) dub k (￿i) the bidders￿pseudotypes, which show the
maximum score that bidder i can generate, and will be well-de￿ned once the scoring
rule is given. Inserting for the cost function in the maximization problem, and







Consumers￿surplus is increasing in ￿i if A > 1
4 and decreasing if A < 1
4. If A = 1
4,
the consumer surplus is independent of ￿i and the na￿ve scoring auction yields a
￿rst-best outcome. Hence, the na￿ve scoring auction is the optimal one.
c) The optimal price auction Now, assume that A = 1
4 and turn to the
price auction. Assume that the auctioneer has announced a quality threshold, s0;
that all bids must meet to compete, and that the winner is determined solely by the














So, unlike the scoring auction, there is only one type that can maximize consumer
surplus given the chosen quality threshold, s0. I can then state the following:
Proposition 1 If A = 1
4, all ￿rms are able to deliver the same maximal consumer
surplus in a na￿ve scoring auction. This is independent of their type and the distri-
bution of types. In a price auction, only the type ￿i = 1
2
p
s0 is able to deliver this
surplus.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Regardless of the type distribution, there exists a knife-edge situation where the
auctioneer, using his true preferences as a scoring function, is able to level the ￿eld
resulting in a ￿rst-best outcome. The scoring auction allows ￿rms to exploit their
comparative advantages when posting bids, with the consequence that there is no
expected pro￿t for the winning ￿rm. However, in a price auction, the auctioneer
needs to design the auction to ￿t the most e¢ cient ￿rm to reach ￿rst-best, and
to ensure competition adjusting quality is needed; thus, the auctioneer is forced to
leave some rent to the most e¢ cient ￿rm.
The result for the scoring auction is quite intriguing since it makes apparently
di⁄erent ￿rms compete the pro￿t away. This is, however, dependent of the shape of
the auctioneer￿ s preferences and the ￿rms￿cost functions. Nevertheless, it indicates
that the scoring auction has properties that make, at least, the auctioneer better o⁄.
The next sections discuss how this result carries over when 0 < A < 1
4 and A = 0:7
2) 0 < A < 1
4
For notational ease, denote the expected score from a na￿ve scoring auction
E (￿(p;s)) = ￿s; and let ￿￿ denote the expected score in an optimal scoring auc-
tion E (￿(p;s;￿)). Expected consumer surplus E (V (p;s;￿)) is written as V s; V ￿,
7I do not discuss the situation where A > 1
4 as this mirrors the results for 0 < A < 1
4.
8and V p for the three auctions. Let the expected pro￿t for the bidders be given by,
￿s;￿￿;and￿p for the na￿ve score, optimal score, and optimal price auction, respec-
tively.
a) The na￿ve scoring auction First, consider the na￿ve scoring auction re-
￿ ecting true preferences, ￿ = 1 in (3). Generally, the expected score from the









i))dF (￿1)dF (￿2) i = 1;2; (9)
where the double integral is the expected maximum score that the pseudotype ranked
as second best can deliver. Types are independently uniformly distributed over the
square [￿L;￿H] ￿ [￿L;￿H]: The type space is illustrated in Figure 1, and I use the












i)d￿1d￿2 i = 1;2; (10)
where ￿ = ￿H ￿ ￿L: Because A < 1
4; k (￿
￿
1) > k (￿
￿
2); and the winning score, tW; is
then the maximum score ￿rm 2 can deliver, his pseudotype is:
t










2￿2 (￿ ￿ ￿L￿);
where ￿ = ln
￿H
￿L: The corresponding expected consumers￿surplus is thus given as:
V
s = v0 +
(1 ￿ 4A)
2￿2 (￿ ￿ ￿L￿): (12)









i) ￿ mink (￿
￿
i))dF (￿1)dF (￿2); i = 1;2; (13)








Figure 1: Illustration of the type space [￿L;￿H]￿[￿L;￿H]:The shaded area represent
the interval where ￿1 < ￿2:
b) The optimal scoring auction As pointed out by Che (1993), the auc-
tioneer can, in certain environments, improve upon this outcome by distorting from
his true preferences for quality. Speci￿cally, the auctioneer distorts his preferences
for quality downwards to limit the information rent associated with higher quality
(La⁄ont and Tirole (1993)). In this case, let ￿ in (3) take any value, and let ￿￿ be
the optimal ￿. Pseudotypes are given by:
















and since 0 < A < 1
4, ￿rm 1 will have the lowest cost, and the winning score will
be decided by ￿rm 2￿ s maximal score. The expected score in an optimal scoring




2￿2 (￿ ￿ ￿L￿): (16)
































































The corresponding expected consumer surplus is:
V











and rewriting this yields:
V





















The ￿rst term of the integrand in (21) relates to preferences towards quality, and
the term is maximized when ￿ = 1: The last term re￿ ects rent extraction. The
auctioneer must balance his wish for optimal quality, on the one hand, against
11limiting the pro￿t for the winning ￿rm on the other. Also, from the last term in the
integrand and (20), it becomes evident that the auctioneer can extract all rent from
the bidders if he sets ￿ = 2
p
A: To see this, let ~ ￿ be the distortion that completely
levels the ￿eld between pseudotypes:
k (￿
￿
1) = k (￿
￿
2) (22)
~ ￿2 ￿ 4A
4￿1
=
~ ￿2 ￿ 4A
4￿2
:
For this to be the case, ~ ￿ = 2
p
A; and the playing ￿eld is completely levelled. Bid-
ders then compete all pro￿t away, similar to the knife-edge result from proposition
1, where ￿rms use their comparative advantages to win the price at the cost of not
obtaining any expected pro￿t. If the auctioneer sets ￿￿ = 2
p
A; the expected score



























￿2 (￿H￿ ￿ ￿): (23)
If he sets ￿￿ > 2
p
A, he will maximize (21) with respect to ￿. Let ^ ￿ denote this
value. Integrating (21) yields the expected consumer surplus:
V




2￿(￿H￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
2 ((2￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 3￿) ￿ 4A(￿ ￿ ￿L￿)
￿
: (24)





￿ = ^ ￿ ￿
￿￿H ￿ ￿
(2￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 3￿
;
12and, hence, the expected consumer surplus can be written as:
V
￿ (￿
￿ = ^ ￿) = v0 +
1
2￿2 (^ ￿(￿H￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ 4A(￿ ￿ ￿L￿)); (26)



































2￿2 ((￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 2￿):
Note that the auctioneer will never set ￿￿ < 2
p
A, as this would reverse the ranking
of the ￿rms, and make the ￿rm with the highest cost the highest pseudotype. So
￿￿ ￿ 2
p
A: However, since ^ ￿ is independent of A, ^ ￿ may be lower than 2
p
A, and,
if that is the case, the auctioneer will prefer to set ￿￿ = ~ ￿ = 2
p
A. If ^ ￿ > 2
p
A,
the auctioneer will prefer to set ￿￿ = ^ ￿ since this yields a higher expected consumer
surplus. The reason for ^ ￿ being independent of A is that it relates to marginal cost,
while A relates to ￿xed costs. The conditions for which the auctioneer will choose






(2￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 3￿
￿ ^ ￿: (29)
Holding ￿L in (29) ￿xed and taking limits indicate that when ￿H ! ￿L; ^ ￿ ! 1, and
when ￿H ! 1; ^ ￿ ! 1
2. When A ! 0; 2
p
A ￿! 0, and when A ! 1
4; 2
p
A ￿! 1 :
So when the type space is small, there are smaller comparative advantages and the
auctioneer will set ￿￿ = ^ ￿, and in the limit his true preferences will be used in the
optimal scoring auction. When the type space increases and there are comparative
advantages (A increases); the auctioneer will be able to level the ￿eld and extract
13all rent. For this to be the case, A > 1
16: So for low values of A, the auctioneer will














(2￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 3￿
￿
: (30)



































2￿2 ((￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 2￿) if ￿￿ =
￿￿H￿￿
(2￿H+￿L)￿￿3￿




Proposition 2 The optimal scoring auction generates a higher expected consumer
surplus than the na￿ve scoring auction, and a lower expected pro￿t for the bidders.
The optimal scoring auction extracts all pro￿t from bidders if 2
p
A ￿ ^ ￿:
Proof. See Appendix B.
The auctioneer is thus able to raise the expected consumer surplus by using an
optimal scoring auction instead of a scoring auction re￿ ecting his true preferences.
However, this limits the information rent of the winning ￿rm, which would prefer
the na￿ve scoring auction. Because of the rent extraction, there will be an e¢ ciency
loss using the optimal auction, so the auctioneer needs strong commitment to be
able to use the optimal form, for example, through legislation as within the EU
directive for public procurement.
c) The optimal price auction The next question is then how the scoring
auctions compare with the optimal price auction. In the optimal price auction, the
auctioneer optimizes the quality threshold, s0; before conducting the auction, i.e.,
8Note that for 0 < A ￿ 1
4, the auctioneer will set ￿ ￿ 1 with strict equality only when A = 1
4,
as the optimal scoring auction and the naive scoring auction then coincide.
14he is maximizing the expected consumer surplus with respect to s0: This auction is
rather hard to solve analytically since what is the most cost e¢ cient ￿rm depends on
the interval [￿L;￿H]￿[￿L;￿H], the quality threshold, s0, and the common ￿xed-cost












It is clear that this will not always hold, and there might be intervals where ￿rm
2 has the lowest cost. The optimal price auction then needs to be solved for four




L > s0 > A
￿L￿H,
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H > s0, I can ￿nd
the expected consumer surplus and expected pro￿t explicitly, while for the intervals
A
￿2
L > s0 > A
￿L￿H and A
￿L￿H > s0 > A
￿2
H, I need to use numerical simulations to solve
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H < s0 < A
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2




the terms v1￿v4 and ￿1￿￿4 are de￿ned in Appendix A, where a full description of the
solution and numerical simulation is given. The solution is also shown graphically in
15Appendix A (Figures 2 - 5) Based on the numerical simulations of the price auction,
I state the following:
Conjecture 1 In an auction where bidders have comparative advantages, the op-
timal scoring rule always generates higher surplus than the na￿ve scoring rule and
the optimal price auction for a given interval [￿L;￿H] and A < 1
4: The bidders can,
however, realize a higher expected pro￿t in the optimal price auction when A ! 1
4
and the type interval grows larger.
Summing up, I have found that there exist situations where both the auctioneer
and bidders prefer the na￿ve scoring auction to the optimal price auction with quality
threshold. However, the auctioneer can improve on the outcome by changing the
weight attached to quality in the scoring auction. Then he can extract some, if not
all, the rent from the bidders. This is done by allowing the ￿rms to compete harder
along their comparative advantages; thus, he is levelling the ￿eld and toughens
competition.
3) A = 0:
To highlight some of the features of the scoring auction and show the relationship to
Che (1993), I now turn to the case where ￿rms only di⁄er with respect to marginal
costs, so A = 0. In this situation, the ￿rms￿cost function is given by:
ci = ￿is; i = 1;2: (35)
a) The na￿ve scoring auction Assuming as above that ￿1 < ￿2, we focus on
the shaded area above the 45￿ line in Figure 1. In the scoring auctions, the winning
score will then be decided by ￿rm 2￿ s pseudotype. By setting A = 0 in equations
(12) and (14), I ￿nd the expected consumer surplus and bidders￿expected pro￿t in
the na￿ve scoring auction to be:
V
s = v0 +
1




2￿2 ((￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 2￿): (37)
16b) The optimal scoring auction By the same reasoning, I ￿nd the expected
consumer surplus and expected pro￿t in the optimal scoring auction by setting A = 0
in equations (31) and (32):9
V
￿ = v0 +
(￿￿H ￿ ￿)
2





2 ((￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 2￿)
2￿2 (3￿ ￿ (2￿H + ￿L)￿)
2 : (39)
c) The optimal price auction In this case, I can also solve the optimal price
auction directly. The auctioneer maximizes the expected consumer surplus to ￿nd
the quality threshold, s0; before conducting the auction. Given the uniform distri-
bution and ￿rm 1 being the most cost e⁄ective one, the auctioneer must maximize
the following expression:
V





















which, in turn, gives us an expected consumer surplus of:
V




9Note that the auctioneer, in this case, always will set ￿￿ = b ￿;(see equation (25)) since this is
always higher than 2
p
A = 0:
17Because higher ￿i indicates higher costs, the auctioneer should lower the quality














I can then compare the three auction formats when A = 0, and state the following:
Proposition 3 When there are only marginal cost di⁄erences, the expected con-
sumer surplus is higher in an optimal scoring auction than in a na￿ve scoring auc-
tion, which, in turn, dominates the optimal price auction with quality threshold.
The winning bidder￿ s expected pro￿t is higher in a na￿ve scoring than in the optimal
scoring and price auction.
Proof. See Appendix B
This means that both auctioneer and bidders will prefer the scoring auction
to a price-only auction with quality threshold when there are only marginal cost
di⁄erences. The reason is that there is an e¢ ciency gain to be split between the
auctioneer and the winning bidder by allowing quality to vary freely. So both the
auctioneer and bidders can bene￿t from using a scoring auction instead of a price
auction. For the auctioneer, this will always be the case even if he is not able to
commit to an optimal scoring auction. The bidders will always prefer the na￿ve
scoring auction to the optimal price auction. However, if the auctioneer is able
to commit to an optimal scoring auction, there exist situations where the bidders
would prefer an optimal price auction. It should come as no surprise that the na￿ve
scoring auction results in higher total welfare than the two other mechanisms as
these optimal mechanisms involve rent extraction from the bidders at the expense
of an e¢ ciency loss.
184 Conclusion
This paper shows that there exist situations where scoring auctions can bene￿t
both the auctioneer and the bidders. When ￿rms have comparative advantages,
the scoring mechanism allows the bidders to exploit these advantages when forming
their bids and toughens competition. If the auctioneer uses his true preferences
as the scoring function, then both bidders and the auctioneer prefer the scoring
auction to the optimal price auction when ￿xed costs are not too high and the type
interval is small. There even exists a situation where the mechanism results in a
￿rst-best outcome and leaves the bidders with no expected pro￿t. If the auctioneer
can commit to an optimal scoring auction, then zero expected pro￿t for the winners
can be sustained for a broader interval, exploiting ￿rms￿comparative advantages.
This will typically be the case when the common ￿xed-cost parameter is high (close
to 1
4) and the type space is large. For an auctioneer who maximizes consumer
surplus, the optimal scoring auction dominates the na￿ve scoring auction that, in
turn, dominates the optimal price auction. Bidders￿pro￿t will always be higher in
a na￿ve scoring auction compared with an optimal scoring auction, and, up to a
certain level of ￿xed cost, compared with the optimal price auction. Total welfare
will always be higher in the na￿ve scoring auction since the two optimal mechanisms
involve quality distortion and, thus, an e¢ ciency loss.
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20Appendices
A Optimal price auction
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￿L (c1 ￿ c2)d￿1d￿2
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In case A > 0, the optimal price auction is di¢ cult to solve analytically since the
most cost-e¢ cient ￿rm will change in the interval [￿L;￿H]￿[￿L;￿H] depending on the
relationship between the quality threshold s0 and the common ￿xed-cost parameter,
A. Therefore, I have solved the problem by numerical simulations. Performing the
integrations given in equations (33) and (34); the expected consumer surplus and
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￿2 (a + b + c + d) if A






￿2 (e + b + f + d) if A
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￿2 (g + h + i + j) if A




￿2 (k + l + m + j) if A
￿2








where a ￿ m is:
a = A
￿

























































































2(￿H + ￿L) + 2￿H ln
A
s0
































H > s0, I have found s0 explicitly, while
for the two intermediate intervals, s0 is found by numerical simulations by solving
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H < s0 < A
￿L￿H
:
Solving these two equations numerically and combining with the explicit solu-
tions for the two other intervals yields the expected consumer surplus and expected
pro￿t for the optimal price auctions. The results are illustrated in Figures 2-5.
In Figure 2 and 3, I give a short summary of the simulations where I ￿x ￿L = 1











, and change ￿H exogenously
between [2;20]: These simulations give rise to the conjecture 1.
In the top part of Figure 2, A = 0; so I am considering the case where the
cost function is given by ci = ￿is; in the bottom, A = 1
16: In the top part of
Figure 3, A = 3
16, and the bottom, A = 1
4: When A is getting closer to 1
4, the
price auction generates higher pro￿t than the na￿ve scoring auction. Note also that
the auctioneer is able to extract all pro￿t from the bidders in the optimal scoring
auction (the dotted black line) as A increases. So bidders might prefer the price-only
auction when their comparative advantages are of a character so that they will be
moving towards ￿pseudotype￿equality in the scoring auctions, while they, in any
price auction, are very di⁄erent. Next, in Figure 4, in the top part, ￿H = 2; and,
in the bottom, ￿H = 5: In Figure 5 ￿H = 10 and ￿H = 20 in the top and bottom
respectively.
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, ￿L = 1 and ￿H = f10;20g
28B Proofs
Proof of proposition 1 In the scoring auction, if A = 1
4; v￿ (￿i;s) = v0 , which is
independent of ￿i. For the price auction, inserting ￿i = 1
2
p
s0 and A = 1
4 in the
surplus function yields v0:￿
Proof of proposition 2 I ￿rst prove that the expected consumer surplus in the op-
timal scoring auction is equal to or larger than the expected consumer surplus
in the na￿ve scoring auction, and that the reverse holds for bidders￿expected
pro￿ts. For the expected consumer surplus in optimal scoring auctions to be







2￿2 (^ ￿(￿H￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ 4A(￿ ￿ ￿L￿)) ￿ v0 +
(1 ￿ 4A)
2￿2 (￿ ￿ ￿L￿):
Inserting for ^ ￿ =
(￿H￿￿￿)
((2￿H+￿L)￿￿3￿) and rearranging this inequality yields:




This expression holds with equality if ￿H = ￿L; and di⁄erentiation of ￿H yields:
d
d￿H














Which, after rearranging the terms, gives:
(￿H ￿ ￿L)
2 ￿ 0:
This shows that if ￿H > ￿L; the left-hand side increases faster than the left-
hand side in equation (46); hence, I have proved that the expected consumer
29surplus in the optimal scoring auction is larger than in the na￿ve scoring auc-
tion. For the expected pro￿t for bidders to be higher in the na￿ve scoring











4￿2 ((￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 2￿):
Rearranging this yields:




Which is the same condition as in (46) above, and, hence, the expected pro￿t
for bidders in the na￿ve scoring auction is higher than that in the optimal
scoring auction.￿
Proof of proposition 3 When there are only marginal cost di⁄erences (A = 0),
for the expected consumer surplus to be higher in the optimal scoring auction







2￿2 ￿ v0 +
￿ ￿ ￿L￿
2￿2 :
Inserting for ￿ =
(￿H￿￿￿)
((2￿H+￿L)￿￿3￿); and rearranging this inequality yields:




This is the same condition as (46) in the proof above; hence, it follows that
V ￿ ￿ V s: For the expected consumer surplus in the na￿ve scoring auction to
be higher than the expected consumer surplus in the optimal price auction,











Rearranging the inequality yields:


















So, if ￿H > ￿L, the following ranking is true: V ￿ > V s > V p: Bidders￿






(￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 2￿
4￿2 ￿
￿2 ((￿H + ￿L)￿ ￿ 2￿)
4￿2 :
This holds with strict equality if ￿H = ￿L and ￿ < 1; the optimal distortion
￿ < 1, if:
(ln￿H ￿ ln￿L)￿H ￿ (￿H ￿ ￿L)
(2￿H + ￿L)(ln￿H ￿ ln￿L) ￿ 3(￿H ￿ ￿L)
< 1




31Which, after rearranging, yields:




This is the same condition as (46);and I can conclude that ￿ < 1 =) ￿s ￿ ￿￿.
For the na￿ve scoring auction to yield a higher expected pro￿t than the optimal




















2(￿H + ￿L)(2￿H + ￿L)
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